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to the difference in paradigms. For example, according to the authors, to 
support sola Scriptura one need only show that it can be derived from 
Scripture. However, since this derivation itself presupposes perspicuity, 
such an argument for sola Scriptura is question-begging. Similarly, the au-
thors think “theological paradigms” have to be evaluated by whether they 
are “biblical.” But what goes into their idea of being “biblical” already 
includes a theological paradigm presupposing perspicuity.
I share deeply the authors’ desire that Protestants and Catholics over-
come what has divided us these five hundred years and enjoy together 
again the unity Christ prayed for in chapter 17 of St. John’s Gospel. This 
book illustrates that doing so will require acknowledging and evaluat-
ing together the second-order reasons that underlie the first-order reasons 
that still divide us.
Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination , by John Corvino, Ryan T. 
Anderson, and Sherif Girgis. Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. viii + 343. 
$ 14.55 (paperback).
KEVIN VALLIER, Bowling Green State University
Not long ago, conservatives and progressives agreed upon the importance 
of religious liberty. In 1993, in response to the Supreme Court’s Employ-
ment Division v. Smith ruling, Congress passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) with near unanimity. RFRA served as a basis for 
defending religious liberty, including the practice of religious exemptions. 
The federal government was prohibited from restricting religious liberty 
unless doing so preserved an important government interest and was the 
least restrictive means of preserving that interest.
With the legalization of same-sex marriage, and Obamacare’s health 
insurance mandate, this consensus fell apart. Some conservative Christian 
business owners suddenly found themselves subject to anti-discrimination 
law that, in their minds, requires them to serve and approve of same-sex 
marriage against their religious conscience. In response, they have sought 
religious exemptions from these new laws. And with Obamacare requir-
ing contraceptive coverage, which includes drugs and devices that many 
believe are abortifacients, many non-profit groups, and a few closely held 
for-profit religious organizations like Hobby Lobby, requested religious 
exemptions to protect themselves from being complicit in the sins of con-
traception and abortion.
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In both cases, conservatives defend religious exemptions as part of re-
ligious liberty. And in both cases, progressives oppose religious exemp-
tions, sometimes on the grounds of equality and anti-discrimination, and 
in other cases based on women’s health.
Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination subjects these religious 
exemption claims to philosophical scrutiny. John Corvino ably defends 
a moderate progressive position, allowing religious exemptions in some 
cases, but limiting them in others. Ryan T. Anderson and Sherif Girgis 
defend a moderate conservative position, allowing religious exemptions 
in far more cases than Corvino, but accepting other limitations imposed 
by some anti-discrimination laws. As my use of the term “moderate” 
suggests, the two sides are closer together than their counterparts in US 
politics. Though while moderation is welcome, it makes following their 
differences more difficult than one might think going in.
A surprising feature of the book is that the two sides adopt different 
philosophical methodologies. Corvino defends his position based on par-
ticular cases and intuition pumps, whereas Anderson and Girgis outline a 
new natural law defense of religious liberty, based on the work of figures 
like Robert George and John Finnis. Corvino deliberately avoids com-
mitting himself to a particular normative framework, whereas Anderson 
and Girgis commit themselves eagerly. This methodological asymmetry 
may prove challenging for readers, as I found it difficult to determine 
which method to use to decide which side is correct. In the end, I think 
Corvino makes the stronger case simply because his methodological ap-
proach is more dialectically effective. Most readers will appreciate his 
cases and understand his arguments, since they will not have to grasp 
an entire political theory and then apply it systematically to cases. While 
Anderson and Girgis should be commended for laying out their method 
so that the reader can evaluate their position, it is more likely to turn read-
ers off given that few readers are likely to adopt their new natural law 
framework.
The book begins with a helpful introduction by all three authors to reli-
gious freedom controversies in the United States. Corvino’s essay defends 
religious liberty limited by concern for equality and non-discrimination. 
Corvino is worried that current law gives religious people special privi-
leges that they neither morally nor constitutionally merit. He argues that 
the moral demands of non-discrimination and equality should lead us to 
circumscribe religious exemptions, and to limit the expansive implica-
tions of RFRA to protect LGBT citizens, among others. Even so, Corvino 
supports many religious exemptions, including constrained religious ex-
emptions for Christian wedding service providers.
Anderson and Girgis’s essay outlines their new natural law defense of 
religious liberty that appeals to the basic good of being able to live an 
integrated life, that is, to live according to one’s own understanding of 
life’s purpose and what has ultimate value. They then argue that religious 
exemptions secure the capacity of people of faith (and secular persons) 
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to live integrated lives without harming or discriminating against others. 
They support many anti-discrimination laws and various important pro-
tections for LGBT citizens. However, they oppose the Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity (SOGI) laws supported by Corvino on a number of 
grounds, such as that SOGI laws are unnecessary to protect the equality 
and liberty of all.
The book concludes with two response essays, the first from Corvino, 
who stresses some concerns about appeals to integrity, the drawbacks of 
having too many exemptions, and the need for SOGI laws. Corvino de-
ploys the familiar analogy between racial and sexual discrimination, and 
argues that Anderson and Girgis’s case for religious exemptions requires 
exemptions for racists, which constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of their 
position. In their reply to Corvino, Anderson and Girgis double down on 
the importance of protecting religious liberty, defending, among other 
things, religious exemptions for Hobby Lobby and other commercial es-
tablishments. They also reject Corvino’s race analogy.
My central concern about the book is that both Corvino and Anderson 
and Girgis commit themselves to positions that end up fairly hostile to 
religious liberty. Corvino’s view faces four difficulties that arise from his 
more focused and variable arguments, whereas Anderson and Girgis’s 
natural law defense of liberty raises one broad concern.
Let’s begin with Corvino. One reason that Corvino dislikes many reli-
gious exemptions is that they manifest a kind of religious privilege, giv-
ing religious people liberties that secular people lack. Many defenders of 
religious liberty agree, and want to extend exemptions to secular persons 
(Anderson and Girgis are among them), much as the US does with exemp-
tions from the military draft. But Corvino worries that if we level up secular 
exemptions to religious exemptions, we will justify too many exemptions, 
leaving us with a “Swiss cheese” legal system that is less egalitarian and 
less manageable than we ought to have. However, there is another alter-
native way of leveling up than to create a Swiss cheese legal system, and 
that is to have fewer laws in the first place. One need not be a libertarian 
to think that the modern administrative state’s control over the lives of or-
dinary citizens is far too extensive. Perhaps government should not be in 
the business of telling private businesses how to provide healthcare cover-
age, and should instead focus on the direct provision of health insurance, 
which leaves businesses alone. Some may find this alterative to Swiss 
cheese law a bit too libertarian, but that a view is moderately libertarian 
is not a reductio ad absurdum. Moreover, strictly speaking, my healthcare 
policy suggestion is single-payer healthcare, hardly a libertarian position, 
and so suggests we may be able to limit government interference in ways 
that are both principled and social democratic.
A second difficulty is that Corvino persistently confuses denying 
someone a benefit with refusing to provide it. For instance, Corvino char-
acterizes business owners who decline providing their employees with 
contraceptive coverage as “impos[ing] their faith on employees indirectly” 
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because they’re denying their employees “insurance coverage that is oth-
erwise legally mandated” (42–43). This is a mischaracterization because it 
threatens to make any refusal on the part of a boss to provide benefits to 
her employees as an imposition upon them or a restriction of their free-
dom. If a boss fails to give his employee a raise, he has imposed a pay cut 
on her. If a boss fails to throw one of his workers a birthday party, then he 
has interfered with that party. Generally speaking, X does not deny p to Y 
or interfere with Y’s securing p by refusing to pay for p. Corvino is bound 
to reply that facts about whether X interferes with Y depends on Y’s legal 
entitlements. If Y is legally entitled to healthcare benefits by means of a 
normatively legitimate law, then employer X’s religious exemption from 
paying for healthcare services to which Y is legally entitled is interference. 
But the case for religious exemptions is based on the moral imperative to 
protect fundamental religious liberties, a right that should undermine the 
normative legitimacy of those legislatively granted entitlements in many 
of the relevant cases.
Corvino’s discussion of anti-discrimination law raises a third concern 
because he characterizes tax-exempt status for religious organizations as 
a subsidy from the public. He argues that we should probably not “con-
tinue to subsidize [these groups] when they refuse to comply with anti-
discrimination law” (210). But exempting someone from a tax is not the 
same thing as subsidizing them. Tax exemptions and subsidies are only 
equivalent if the nation-state has a default claim on everyone’s income, 
such that not taxing them is simply for the state to redirect its resources 
elsewhere. But if there are even modest background property rights that 
specify ownership relations independently of legislative bodies, then a tax 
is confiscation from an owner even when the tax is justified. A tax ex-
emption is simply a refusal to confiscate. A subsidy, in contrast, involves 
giving someone money to which they would not otherwise be entitled. 
Corvino needs this distinction because without it there is no way to make 
sense of separating church and state. If all tax exemptions are subsidies, 
then the American public subsidizes churches all the time, and so tax ex-
emptions for churches are tantamount to religious establishment. This is 
an odd result.
Finally, Corvino is too dismissive of integrity-based arguments for re-
ligious exemptions. Religion-friendly philosophers often defend religious 
liberty by appealing to the value of living an integrated life, where a per-
son’s life is built around fidelity to her own projects, plans, and principles. 
Religious liberty are important for persons with religious projects, plans, 
and principles. Since living an integrated life seems to be one of the most 
fundamental goals and interests of human beings, integrity-based argu-
ments for religious liberty are potentially powerful. It is especially power-
ful in the new natural law framework that Anderson and Girgis employ. 
Corvino worries about the value of integrity because a person can live an 
integrated life around bad and wicked projects, plans, and principles. So in-
tegrity by itself, or at least a formal commitment to respecting integrity, is 
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only a conditional basis for securing religious liberty. Anderson and Girgis 
worry that Corvino suggests that integrity has value “only when the un-
derlying belief is true” (259), which seems highly counterintuitive, given 
that we ordinarily think that people can have valuable lives even if their 
projects, plans, and principles are misguided. Corvino responds that his 
claim is more modest, “that integrity—in their specific sense of harmony 
between belief and action—may lack value when the underlying belief 
is badly wrong” (211). But Corvino gives us little help in distinguishing 
between integrity-based commitments that generate reasons for others to 
allow them to live an integrated life, and integrity-based commitments 
that generate no such reasons. This leaves the reader to wonder whether 
Corvino will only allow the integrity to generate religious exemptions in 
a very narrow range of cases, which is a more modest way of expressing 
Anderson and Girgis’s worry.
Anderson and Girgis, I grant, have the opposite problem since they 
don’t draw a clear line between forms of integrity we should respect 
and those we should not. Yet, since integrity generally merits respect, 
Anderson and Girgis are on better ground in erring on the side of more 
liberty rather than less.
In sum, then, I have four concerns about Corvino’s arguments: (1) Swiss 
cheese law can be avoided with moderately limited government, (2) an 
employer’s refusal to provide a service is not the same as denying it to 
them, (3) we should distinguish tax exemptions from subsidies to avoid 
undermining separation of church and state, and (4) we need a better crite-
rion for distinguishing between normatively significant and normatively 
insignificant integrity lest we be too dismissive.
While I have expressed a number of concerns about Corvino’s argu-
ments, I have one, much bigger, concern about Anderson and Girgis’s new 
natural law approach to justifying religious liberty.
Roughly, the new natural law defense of religious liberty postulates 
that there is a list of basic, objective goods that, when possessed, make a 
life go well and that help each person to flourish. Basic goods give all per-
sons reason to respect and protect the capacity of persons to enjoy those 
basic goods, and persons have natural rights to pursue those basic goods 
as a result.
Among these basic goods is the good of religion, which involves the 
free pursuit of ultimate meaning and value. The good of religion can be 
realized in non-religious contexts, but it primarily secures the liberty to 
pursue answers to life’s most basic questions. The nice thing about the 
good of religion is that it seems most people have an interest in pursuing 
such an open-ended good, and so seems to ground a wide range of basic 
goods. Further, a natural right of religious liberty can cover and protect 
the pursuit of those basic goods.
The problem with this defense is that it presumes that supernatural goods 
do not override natural goods. Let me illustrate. Anderson and Girgis are 
Roman Catholics, and Catholics acknowledge a panoply of supernatural 
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goods, goods that come from God or direct contact with God that are 
revealed to Christian believers. These goods include the enjoyment of 
sacraments like baptism, confession, and the Eucharist. Both Anderson 
and Girgis are committed to the view that enjoying supernatural goods is 
supremely great and make a life that contains these goods better than a life 
that does not. Valid sacraments give those who enjoy them incomparable 
value. For God is the font and source of all goodness and direct contact 
with Him has unsurpassable worth.
If Anderson and Girgis are correct about this, then they must face the 
possibility of conflict between the good of religion and the enjoyment of 
supernatural goods. For Anderson and Girgis, Jews and Muslims enjoy 
the natural good of religion, but they live lives with diminished access 
to supernatural goods, goods that seem to outweigh the natural good of 
religion in cases of trade-offs. Jews and Muslims, for instance, do not have 
valid sacraments, a spectacular loss.
So why not restrict the right of religious liberty to the liberty to prac-
tice the Roman Catholic faith? Such restrictions will yield some costs to 
the natural good of religion, and it will probably be hard to implement. 
But if a regime could successfully limit religious liberty to Catholicism, it 
will generate much more objective value and flourishing for those who 
live in that regime than a regime that allows people to choose different 
faiths. This is because Catholics enjoy special access to all the sacraments 
(shared by Eastern Orthodox Christians, but probably not Protestants). So 
if we acknowledge supernatural goods, the case for religious liberty based 
on the natural good of religion seems severely compromised. Pragmatic 
challenges alone stand in the way of a strongly establishmentarian public 
policy. This will prove cold comfort to non-Catholics. Their liberties are 
only protected insofar as the state is incompetent to limit those liberties 
effectively.
Anderson and Girgis may reply that supernatural and natural goods 
do not ordinarily conflict, but it is hard to see how the argument will go. 
Ordinary life, for instance, will force a Catholic to decide between, say, 
receiving the Eucharist or going to the grocery store; so sometimes pur-
suing natural and supernatural goods will conflict with each other. Since 
the good can be compared, then we can sensibly say that a life devoid of 
valid sacraments is, all else equal, a worse life than one full of valid sacra-
ments, and some humans enjoy valid sacraments while others do not. 
Those who do not enjoy valid sacraments would have better lives were 
they Catholic, rather than being Muslim or Jewish. Thus, Jews and Mus-
lims in effect trade-off the natural good of religion enjoyed in their faith 
with the supernatural good of enjoying valid sacraments. There’s a spe-
cific conflict between supernatural and natural goods, and that conflict 
seems obvious.
Roman Catholic new natural law theorists must be prepared to admit 
conflicts between the natural good of religion and the supernatural good 
of valid sacraments. If so, even the most basic elements of a right of 
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religious liberty are insecure, and have only a pragmatic, not a principled 
basis. Whatever the faults of Corvino’s criticisms of religious liberty, I fear 
Anderson and Girgis are committed, by their own lights, to restricting 
religious liberty far more greatly than Corvino proposes. This will place 
them uncomfortably close to the new Catholic integralists, who embrace 
a coercive establishmentarian politics with greatly restricted religious lib-
erty for non-Catholics.
Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will , by John Martin Fischer. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2016. Pp. vii + 243. $ 78 (hardcover).
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John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will is a compilation 
of eleven previously published essays on the topic of divine foreknowl-
edge and human freedom (where freedom is understood as the ability 
to do otherwise than one does). With clear and accessible prose, Fischer 
relentlessly argues for the thesis that divine foreknowledge and human 
freedom are incompatible (a thesis that I will hereafter refer to as incom-
patibilismFF). Throughout the volume, he carefully considers various ob-
jections to his argument, paying particular attention to Ockhamism. Some 
of his more recent essays (co-authored with Patrick Todd and/or Neal 
Tognazzini) emphasize that the issue of explanatory dependence is central to 
the debate. In the end, it seems that although Fischer is convinced by the 
argument for incompatibilismFF, he is not troubled by it. Of course, no one 
familiar with his work defending semi-compatibilism should be surprised: 
Fischer has repeatedly argued that it is possible to be morally responsible 
for one’s actions even if one lacks the freedom to do otherwise; he has 
further argued that, in the light of this possibility, there is no reason to be 
troubled by the lack of such freedom.
In what follows, I will summarize the previously published essays, 
pausing to evaluate the version of the argument for incompatibilismFF on 
which Fischer relies. I will then explain why, despite some objections, I 
cannot do otherwise than recommend this book.
Over the course of the essays, Fischer considers three versions of the 
argument for incompatibilismFF: the “Transfer Version,” the “Conditional 
Version,” and the “Possible-Worlds Version.” In “Scotism,” Fischer criti-
cally evaluates Sir Anthony Kenny’s “Scotistic” response to a Transfer 
Version of the argument, where (i) all Transfer Versions of the argument 
rely (implicitly or explicitly) on so-called “transfer principles” and (ii) 
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